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1. Introduction
Every year over the last decade, well over a million U.S. workers age 55 and older lost
their jobs to layoffs. More than one fifth of the 2010 population between ages 60 and
65 have been displaced at least once since turning fifty. In the meantime, the labor
force participation of individuals older than 55 went up to 40 percent, a ten percentage
point increase relative to 1990. As the fraction of people who remain employed well into
their sixties keeps on growing, those workers increasingly rely on old age earnings. The
exposure and vulnerability of an aging workforce to the consequences of job loss have
manifested themselves most recently during the Great Recession, when unemployment
rates among older persons have reached a historical maximum.2
In this paper I examine how job loss experienced by senior workers at different stages
of the business cycle affects their labor force attachment, their take up of Social Security,
and their lifetime income. I show that involuntary separation at older age results in
substantial economic loss for the affected individuals. On average, the cost of job loss for
a sixty year old male worker computed as an amount of compensation required to keep
him indifferent between the states of employment and unemployment due to displacement
amounts to thirty seven thousand dollars. This is approximately equivalent to an annual
wage earned at this age, a large amount taking into account that the remaining work life
for the majority of affected workers is relatively short. The main source of this cost is the
reduction of post-displacement wages, which accounts for 70 percent of the total. The
get access to the restricted part of the HRS data. My work with the restricted data was supported
by the Social Sciences Research Services at UW-Madison. The initial computations in this paper have
been carried out with Flash High Performance Computing Cluster maintained by the Social Science
Computing Cooperative at UW-Madison. All remaining errors are my own.
2Data sources: The number of workers displaced between 2001 and 2011 is computed from the
Current Population Survey (CPS) Displaced Workers Supplement. The fraction of older workers affected
by layoffs comes from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) dataset. The labor force participation
and unemployment rates are obtained from the CPS.
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remaining 30 percent are due to search frictions, including the cost of job search and the
loss of earnings over the spells of unemployment that follow a job loss.
The effect of involuntary separations on the timing of retirement is not straightfor-
ward. Laid off individuals face the cost of searching for a new job that is likely to yield
lower earnings. Displacement may encourage some of these workers to leave the labor
force sooner than they had planned and to take up Social Security at an earlier age.
Others may prefer to work longer to replenish their retirement savings that may have
been depleted in the course of a post-displacement unemployment spell. These decisions
will obviously depend on the labor market conditions and vary over the business cycle.
The problem is further exacerbated by fluctuations in the value of retirement assets that,
in recent years, have coincided with cyclical movements in the labor market.
This paper is the first to evaluate how retirement decisions are affected simultaneously
by both labor market and asset shocks. The majority of displaced workers retires earlier
than they would have had they not lost a job, by fourteen months on average. In the
meantime, negative shocks to assets delay retirement from the labor force. I estimate that
the cohort of workers who were approaching retirement at the onset of the Great Recession
would tend to stay in the labor force approximately five months longer in response to the
joint impact of changes in the value of household assets and the probabilities of losing
and finding a job. Assuming the same cohort has been affected by the labor market
conditions alone, their retirement would have happened approximately one and a half
months sooner had they not experienced either labor market or asset shocks.
The paper also makes an important methodological contribution. Introducing labor
market frictions into a life cycle model of labor supply, I show that involuntary job loss
is a major retirement channel. Without search frictions, the model overestimates the
rates of employment among seventy year old workers by eight percentage points. At this
age, this is an understatement of retirement prevalence of 14 percent. In a frictionless
environment, most of this difference is absorbed by the fixed cost of work. The fixed cost
of work generates sharp retirement in many models, including French and Jones (2011).
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Rogerson and Wallenius (2013) argue that its typical estimated values are unrealistically
high and lack solid economic interpretation. With search frictions, I increase the share
of retirements that can be explained without relying on fixed cost by approximately ten
percentage points.
My results stem from a dynamic programming model of optimal consumption and
labor supply decisions with costly job search. The model includes uncertainty about
survival, health status, medical expenses, asset returns, wages and availability of jobs. It
accounts for Social Security rules, Medicare, employer provided health insurance, govern-
ment transfers, unemployment insurance, taxes, and intentional bequests. The structural
framework allows me to isolate the effect of layoffs, job finding and asset dynamics on
the labor supply decisions of older workers. It also helps to define a relevant reference
group for studying displaced workers. Varying the probabilities of job loss, job finding
and asset returns, I account for the cyclical movements in the labor market along with
the dynamics of the housing and stock prices. I estimate the model with the method of
simulated moments using data from the Health and Retirement Study.
This paper is related to several strands in the literature. Most important, it builds
upon earlier work on retirement from the labor force within the life cycle framework,
including Blau and Gilleskie (2006, 2008); French and Jones (2011); Gustman and Stein-
meier (1986); Haan and Prowse (2010, 2014); Rust and Phelan (1997); Scholz, et al.
(2006); van der Klaauw and Wolpin (2008). I extend the results in this literature by
incorporating exogenous layoffs, search frictions and time-varying asset returns. None of
these previous papers accounts for the possibility of involuntary job loss followed by en-
dogenous costly search. Adding these features, I address an entirely new set of questions
about retirement behavior.
Next, I contribute to the literature focused on the economic cost of job loss (Farber
1993; Stevens 1997; Jacobson, et al. 1993; Couch and Placzek 2010; Davis and von
Wachter 2011). This literature does not accommodate endogenous retirement, and pro-
duces mixed conclusions on the relationship between age and the cost of displacement. I
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fill in this gap by providing a detailed account of the cost of involuntary job loss for older
workforce. A small number of papers evaluate the impact of layoffs on the employment
of older workers (Chan and Stevens 2001, 2004; Elder 2004). My estimated probabilities
of post-displacement employment rates are consistent with Chan and Stevens (2001),
however I evaluate a broader range of displacement consequences, most important the
economic cost of job loss over the business cycle and its sources. I also model a number
of features that were not addressed in these other papers, yet are essential to the retire-
ment behavior, such as health and unemployment insurance, medical expenses, Social
Security take up, and the dynamics of the labor and financial markets. While Chan and
Stevens (2004) found that pension-related incentives can only explain a small part of
the observed changes in the timing of retirement associated with job loss, I show that
post-displacement wage drop and search frictions can account for a large part of the
response.
Finally, there is literature that analyzes the dynamics of retirement over the business
cycle. Coile and Levine (2011a,b); Goda et al. (2011); McFall (2011) implemented a
reduced form approach to study retirement during recessions. Gustman, et al. (2010)
estimated the impact of the stock market decline on retirement using a life cycle model;
however, they abstracted from the role of the labor market shocks. In contrast to the
existing work, my model quantifies independent and combined long term effects of wealth
changes, layoffs and job finding on the labor market behavior of older workers.
The rest of the paper is divided into seven sections. Section two provides the essential
data facts on job loss and retirement. In section three I develop the life cycle model
with labor market frictions. Section four describes the dataset used in the structural
estimation, explains the choice of the estimation sample and initial conditions. Section
five contains the details of the method of simulated moments and its implementation,
as well as the estimation methods used to specify exogenous probability transitions and
the policy environment. Section six discusses the estimates of the structural parameters.
Section seven summarizes the results based on the counterfactuals and policy experiments.
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Section eight concludes.
2. Facts about job loss and retirement
I motivate the paper by highlighting the key facts on displacement and labor force at-
tachment in the Health and Retirement Study (HRS, http://hrsonline.isr.umich.edu/), a
nationally representative panel of individuals over the age of fifty. I document the preva-
lence of layoffs among older workers and estimate reduced form relationships between
involuntary job loss, employment and earnings.3 The data analysis is based on employ-
ment histories of males between the ages of 50 and 80 that I construct using biennial data
on their labor force status as well as employment changes reported between the survey
waves.
The definition of involuntary job loss in this paper is based on self-reported reasons
of employment termination. Involuntary job loss is represented by two of the separation
reasons included in the HRS questionnaires, “laid off/let go” and “business closed”. All
other separation reasons, including quit, health, family, new job, retirement or financial
incentives, are classified as quits. The dataset contains information on 3,093 layoffs that
represent 30 percent of all reported separations. According to this definition, involuntary
job loss is quite common among older workers, with one in six survey respondents having
been laid off at least once.
This number should be treated as a lower bound because of possible misreporting of
the separation reasons that has been documented in the literature. For example, Poterba
and Summers (1984) find that 25 percent of the Current Population Study (CPS) quits
have been reported as layoffs in the following survey month. Although the HRS only
asks about the separation reason for each completed job spell once, adverse employment
3The terms layoff, job loss and displacement are used interchangeably throughout the paper. The
intended meaning is best described as involuntary separation that is initiated by the firm rather than
the worker, as opposed to a quit.
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changes that frequently precede quits suggest that some of them are not easy to distin-
guish from layoffs. Roughly 12 percent of the recorded quits have been encouraged by
co-workers or happened in anticipation of layoff, reduction in wages or hours, or similar
circumstances. Taking such instances into account, I conclude that up to 30 percent of
the respondents may have experienced involuntary separations.
The response of older workers to involuntary job loss increasingly differs from that of
the general population as their employment horizon shortens in anticipation of retirement.
Approximately a quarter of the HRS displaced respondents never get reemployed, and
those who do take 1.8 times longer than non-displaced older workers to find a new job.
To illustrate the relationship between job loss and the labor market outcomes of older
displaced workers, I follow the literature on job displacement (Davis and von Wachter
2011; Jacobson, et al. 1993; Jarosch 2015) and estimate a set of reduced form statistical
models that quantify the impact of involuntary job loss on post-displacement earnings,
employment and wages. The main findings from these regressions are graphically sum-
marized in Figure 1. Details of the methodology and complete estimation results are
provided in Appendix A.
[FIGURE 1]
The left panel of Figure 1 plots the estimated post-displacement employment rate
relative to the employment rate of counterfactual non-displaced workers over ten years
after job loss. In the year of involuntary separation, the employment rate falls by 57
percent. Two thirds of the initial losses are recovered within two years, but then the
recovery slows down. An employment gap of 13 percent persists after eight years. It
finally closes ten years after displacement, in part as both displaced and non-displaced
workers keep on retiring from the labor force. The right panel of Figure 1 plots analogous
results for earnings which also fall sharply immediately after displacement and show little
improvement beyond the first two years of recovery. Unlike employment, earnings do not
recover fully and remain almost 20 percent lower than the counterfactual even ten years
after displacement. The wage loss remains stable over ten year period and on average
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constitutes 9 percent of the counterfactual.
These estimates imply that over the remaining lifetime displaced workers on aver-
age spend thirteen months less in employment. Assuming a discount rate of 4 percent,
earnings losses of displaced workers over a ten year period amount to 28 percent of the
present discounted value of their earnings, which is equivalent to 1.09 of their annual
pre-displacement earnings. The model developed in this paper quantitatively matches
these reduced form relationships and demonstrates how the estimates of the fixed effects
displacement regressions are affected by selection bias. It also takes the analysis further
by answering a range of questions that cannot be addressed within a regression setting.
The gap between the estimated earnings and wage losses suggests that both the wage
drop and job market frictions contribute to the total cost of job loss. In addition, these
two channels interact with the process of asset accumulation and individual responses
to the wealth shocks and interest rates changes. Since the job search process, observed
post-displacement wages, labor supply and saving are jointly endogenous, we cannot
quantify the relative importance of these forces within a reduced-form regression frame-
work. These dynamic decisions reflect individual expectations, which are best understood
in the context of a structural model. Consequently, in the rest of the paper I develop and
estimate a dynamic model of retirement with endogenous job search, labor supply and
asset accumulation. I then use the model to quantify the contribution of the labor market
conditions to the cost of job loss, and to disentangle the impact of the labor market and
asset shocks on the retirement decisions.
3. Model of labor supply, search and retirement
I now develop a dynamic life cycle model of labor supply and retirement with search
frictions and stochastic returns on assets. The model describes the decision problem of
an older worker who faces uncertainty about available employment opportunities, wages,
asset returns, health, medial expenses, and survival. In each period of life, individuals
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make decisions on their labor supply, consumption and savings, job search, and the take
up of Social Security. The model incorporates essential Social Security rules, taxes,
unemployment insurance, government transfers, Medicare and intentional bequests. It
accounts for individual heterogeneity in terms of the lifetime earnings, year of birth, the
risk of layoff, and access to health insurance. The model provides a salient framework to
analyze the impact of job loss and volatility of asset returns on the labor market behavior
of older workers. I proceed with discussion of the key elements of the model.
3.1. Preferences
The time period in the model equals to one month. Each month, an individual aged
t = t0, t1 . . . , tT derives utility from consumption Ct and leisure Lt. Individuals belong to
different types τ i determined by the year of birth, lifetime earnings, the risk of being laid
off, and access to employer provided health insurance. The within-period utility function
is nonseparable in consumption and leisure as in French and Jones (2011),










Parameter θ1 ∈ [0, 1] is the weight placed on consumption, and θ2 ≥ 0 determines the
degree of risk aversion.
Individuals face exogenous mortality risk. An agent at age t survives to age t+1 with
probability πt(Ht, τ
i) that depends on age, health Ht and individual type τ
i. Everyone
dies with probability one upon reaching the terminal age tT . Individuals who die leave
all remaining assets as bequest to their heirs. The value of bequest in the amount At is









This formulation has been derived as a reduced form of an altruistic bequest motive in
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the overlapping generations model by Abel and Warshawsky (1988), and later used to
study saving decisions of the elderly (e.g. De Nardi 2004; De Nardi, et al. 2010). The
coefficient b1 ≥ 0 captures the strength of the bequest motive, while b2 ≥ 0 characterizes
the curvature of the bequest function and determines the extent to which bequests are a
luxury good.
3.2. Time constraints
The quantity of consumed leisure depends on the amount of labor hours Nt supplied out
of a fixed endowment L > 0, the fixed cost of work, health, and the cost of job search:
(3) Lt = L−Nt −
(
φ0 + t · (φ1 + ψ · 1 {Ht = 0})
)
· 1 {Nt > 0} − % · st.
The two indicator functions denote respectively bad health status (Ht = 0) and labor
force participation (Nt > 0). The job search decision, st = {0, 1}, assigns the value one to
actively searching individuals and zero to everyone else. The time constraints (3) say that
the maximum amount of leisure equals to the entire time endowment which is further
reduced depending on labor supply, search and health status.
First, the leisure of employed individuals is decreased by the number of hours worked
and the fixed cost of work. The fixed cost of work is a linear function of age, φ(t) =
φ0 + φ1t, with non-negative intercept and slope, φ0,φ1 ≥ 0. Next, work requires more
effort of individuals with serious health problems, and hence those who stay employed in
spite of illness lose additional tψ hours of leisure a month. Finally, unemployed individuals
looking for work (st = 1) have to sacrifice % hours a month to search related activities.
These are their search costs.
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3.3. Budget constraints
Individuals collect taxable income Yt from wage earnings, Social Security and unemploy-
ment benefits:
(4) Yt = Nt ·Wt ·
(












Wage earnings are determined by the wage rate Wt and the hours of labor supply Nt.
The binary indicator of layoff status `t = {0, 1} takes a value of one if a worker has
ever been laid off from a job and zero otherwise. The wages of displaced workers are
permanently reduced by a factor d1 ∈ [0, 1]. This reduction is interpreted as a loss of
human capital or obsoleteness of skills that caused a layoff. If a worker chooses part-time
employment, his hourly wage rate is decreased by a factor d2 ∈ [0, 1]. This parameter
accounts for an empirical pattern of part-time workers earning substantially less than
comparable full-time workers after adjusting for the number of hours worked.
The size of the Social Security benefits, SSBt(·), is calculated based on the age at
the time of take up T at , individual type τ
i and parameters of the Social Security system
τSS. Individuals who have applied draw a constant stream of benefits until death. Un-
employment benefits Bt are limited to the actively searching unemployed. In the model,
unemployment benefits are assigned conditional on search with probability λB ∈ [0, 1]
to avoid keeping track of the unemployment durations that would be computationally
infeasible.
The assets At of an individual belonging to type τ
i are invested at the rate of return
rt,τ i that varies over time. The rate of return depends on the type of worker and accounts
for the structure of portfolios held by investors in different income brackets. No borrowing
is allowed, At ≥ 0. The budget constraint is
(5) At+1 = At + y(Yt + rt,τ i · At, τ) +Gt −Mt(Ht, It, τ i)− Ct,
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where function y(·, τ) gives after tax income for a tax code τ and Gt ≥ 0 is govern-
ment transfers. Mt(·) is out-of-pocket medical expenses that depend on health, access to
health insurance It, and individual type. The budget constraints (5) state that the value
of assets in the period t + 1 is determined from the previously accumulated assets At
augmented by the total value of the current period’s after-tax and non-taxable income
net of expenditures on consumption and healthcare.
In the data, assets are measured with an error εat that reconciles the model output
with observed individual decisions:
Ât = At · exp(εat )(6)
εat ∼ N(0, σ2εa).
The government provides a minimum consumption level C > 0 through transfers Gt
according to the rule
(7) Gt = max{0, C − [At + y(Yt + rt,τ i · At, τ)−Mt(Ht, It, τ i)]},
as in Hubbard, et al. (1995). For those receiving government transfers, after tax income
in this formulation reduces the amount of government transfers dollar for dollar. Indi-
viduals must totally deplete personal assets before gaining access to the consumption
floor provided by the government, and the entire amount of received transfers must be
consumed in the current period. Government transfers in the model serve as an aggregate
approximation for all public transfer programs other than unemployment insurance and
Medicare.
3.4. Retirement channels
Empirically, most cases of retirement from the labor force take the form of discontinuous
transitions from full-time employment to non-work. A standard life cycle model with
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continuous hours of labor supply cannot capture these transitions because workers smooth
their consumption and leisure over time and retire by gradually reducing the hours of
work. In this paper, several mechanisms jointly generate sharp retirement from the labor
force that is consistent with the data.
The first mechanism is represented by the fixed cost of work and the cost of ill health
that operate through the time constraints. As workers grow older and their health de-
teriorates, they have to give up increasing amounts of their leisure endowment in order
to stay employed, which results in sharp transitions from work to retirement. Second,
retirement is generated by non-linearities in the budget constraints created by the Social
Security and Medicare policies. Wages, which decrease with age to reflect declining pro-
ductivity, also contribute to retirement through the budget constraints. Finally, sharp
retirement is generated by the labor market frictions. This last channel first proposed
here distinguishes the paper from the rest of the literature.
3.5. Recursive formulation
The vector of state variables St for an individual of type τ
i alive at age t includes the
wage rate, medical expenses, health status, and assets. The state is also described by the
employment and search decisions made in the previous period, the age of Social Security
take up, job offer indicator ωt = {0, 1}, layoff experience, the draw of unemployment




Wt,Mt, Ht, At, Nt−1, st−1, T
a
t−1, ωt, `t, Bt, {λk,τ i , δk,τ i , rk,τ i}k=t0...t
)
.
Given the current labor force status, an individual makes decisions Dt about the levels
of consumption and savings, labor supply, job search and take up of Social Security. The
vector of decision variables is Dt(St) = (Ct, Nt, st, T
a
t ). The number of labor supply hours
Nt = 0 for nonworkers, and Nt · st = 0, which rules out on-the-job search.
Timing in the model is as follows. In the beginning of each period an individual can
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be working, unemployed and looking for work, or out of the labor force. All individuals
regardless of their labor force status start the period with receiving two exogenous shocks
that determine their health state and medical expenses. Because of the large spread of
treatment costs for various conditions with similar overall impact on health, two persons
in the same state of health may face very different medical expenses. Even in case of
the same diagnosis, the cost of care may be different depending on the provider, for
example primary physician compared to an emergency room. Hence the health shock
determines the mean of medical expenses through the state of health, while a separate
medical expenses shock generates variance that is high enough to match the data.
Employed individuals receive another type-specific shock that destroys their jobs with
probability δt,τ i ∈ (0, 1). Workers who did not lose their jobs then obtain updated
information on their wages. In the meantime, non-employed individuals get wage offers
with probability
(9) λt,τ i(st) =

λnt,τ i ∈ (0, 1) if st = 0
λut,τ i ∈ (0, 1) if st = 1
where λut,τ i > λ
n
t,τ i are respectively job finding probabilities for unemployed and non-
participating. While the model in principle allows for getting an offer without search,
the chances are much smaller than when an effort is put into searching for employment
opportunities. In addition, only the unemployed who have been searching for jobs in the
previous period may receive unemployment benefits with probability λB. Once the wages
are revealed, workers who retained their jobs or received new offers make labor supply
decisions.
Workers who just lost their jobs or quit, unemployed who did not receive acceptable
offers, and workers who have been out of the labor force decide whether they want to
invest time into looking for work. If they decide to search, they start the next period
as active unemployed, have a higher chance to receive a job offer and may retain their
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unemployment benefits. Otherwise they enter the next period being out of the labor
force.
Next, all individuals make decisions on the Social Security application, on whether to
collect income, pay medical expenses and taxes, enjoy leisure, consume and save. Finally,
they receive a survival shock and either move to the next period or die and leave bequests.
In each period and state St, an individual chooses a decision rule Dt to maximize
discounted expected lifetime utility subject to the exogenous processes for mortality, em-
ployment, health, medical expenses and wage determination, a set of time and budget
constraints (3) and (5), the government transfer rule (7), and policies for taxes, unem-
ployment benefits and Social Security. The discount rate for future payoffs is β. The
values of states with and without a wage offer, V wt and V
n
t , are defined recursively. The
value of a state with a wage offer contains four additive terms: the current utility from
consumption and leisure and the expected present values of unemployment in case of
layoff, employment if not affected by job loss, and utility of bequest if the worker does
not survive to the next period:
V wt (St, Dt−1, θ) = max
Dt
{







V nt+1 (St+1, Dt, θ) · p(dSt+1|St, Dt, θp) +(
1− δt,τ i
) ∫





where θ = {θs, θp} is a vector of model parameters that includes parameters of the state
transition probability function θp and structural parameters θs. Similarly, the value of a
state without a wage offer, V nt , is










V wt+1(St+1, Dt, θ) · p(dSt+1|St, Dt, θp)+
(1− λt,τ i(st))
∫






Because the model does not have a closed form solution, the decision rules it generates
must be found numerically. I use backward induction to solve the value functions at
monthly time intervals. In estimation, the terminal age is set to 100, the maximum
working age to 75, the starting ages to the age of each type in 2000, and part-time work
is under 120 hours per month.4 I estimate the structural parameters of the model using
the method of simulated moments.
4. Data
I estimate the model using the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), HRS RAND dataset
(version P), and the restricted HRS data on earnings records from the Social Security
Administration (SSA). I extract the variables from twelve waves of the HRS that cover
a period from 1992 to 2014 at biennial intervals. In this section I describe the sample
and variables and explain how I use the data to draw initial conditions for the structural
estimation of the model.
4.1. Sample construction and variables
The estimation sample consists of white non-Hispanic males age fifty and older. I further
restrict the sample to moderate the diversity of paths that respondents may take within
the system of Social Security benefits. First, I drop individuals who started receiving
Social Security before turning sixty two as well as the beneficiaries of the Supplemental
Security Income and Social Security Disability Insurance (SSI/SSDI). These conditions
aim to exclude workers with disabilities who may have quite different health transition
processes, access to health insurance and non-labor income. Second, I eliminate anyone
with total employment record under ten years or over ten years of work in the government.
These respondents would either not qualify for Social Security, which requires ten years
4Setting the maximum working age reduces the dimensionality of the problem. Only 10% of the HRS
estimation sample is employed after 75, and less than 3% holds full-time jobs.
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of contributions, or have access to the government pension schemes that are not modeled
in the paper. The sample resulting from these restrictions contains information on 9,402
individuals, or 56,848 person-year observations.
To estimate the processes that govern the state transition probabilities, I use infor-
mation on labor supply, wages and average lifetime earnings, assets, mortality, health,
medical expenses, and health insurance. Except for the average lifetime earnings and
information on layoffs, all variables are taken from the HRS RAND file. The monetary
values are converted into constant 2000 dollars. The SSA data allows me to compute the
average lifetime earnings. In addition, I construct a proxy of the SSA’s average indexed
monthly earnings (AIME) by indexing wages to year 2000 and taking an average of the
top 35 values, replaced by zeroes if not enough years were reported. Indexing is done
with the national wage index. I impute the missing values of medical expenses, average
lifetime earnings and wages using a regression based procedure (David, et al. 1986).5
Labor supply is computed as a product of the usual hours of work in a week and the
average number of weeks in a month. Search decisions are constructed from information
on the current labor force status and questions about job search activities. Layoff in-
cidents and the calendar months in which they happen are extracted from self-reported
employment histories and separation reasons, as described in Appendix B.1. Assets are
measured as the net value of financial and housing wealth of the household. They account
for the value of housing, vehicles, businesses, ownerships in IRA, financial instruments
and investment funds, and other savings and debt. Assets do not include the value of
pensions. I discuss the implications of this restriction in Appendix B.2.
Health status is a binary variable based on the question that asks respondents to
evaluate their own health on a five-point scale as excellent, very good, good, fair, or
poor. I define health status as good for the top three categories, and bad otherwise.
5The fractions of the imputed values of medical expenses and lifetime earnings that are used in the
computations is 2.8 percent and 2.5 percent, respectively. Missing earnings data arise because only about
three quarters of the respondents granted access to their administrative records.
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Medical expenses are individual out-of-pocket payments for health care. These expenses
include the cost of stays in the hospitals and nursing homes, visits to doctors and dentists,
outpatient surgeries, prescription drugs, home health care, and special facilities paid by
the respondent in a two-year reference period. They do not include expenses covered by
health insurance, but do include insurance premiums paid by the respondent.
Access to health insurance is described by a categorical variable that takes three
values: health insurance provided by the current or previous employer to respondents
under 65, respondents older than 65 covered by Medicare, and respondents younger than
65 not insured by employer. The last category involves individuals without any health
insurance (61 percent) as well as insured by privately purchased plans (39 percent). Both
groups pay higher medical expenses on average, either as insurance premiums or as direct
cost of health services. I exclude from the estimation of state transition probabilities for
medical expenses individuals whose only insurance comes from their spouse’s employer or
government plans other than Medicare, such as Medicaid, CHAMPVA and TRICARE.
These respondents together account for 3.6 percent of the estimation sample, with the
largest share (3 percent) made up by those insured through the employers of the spouses.
4.2. Individual heterogeneity and the initial distribution of state
variables
To estimate the structural parameters of the model, I only use eight waves of the HRS data
covering the period from 2000 to 2014. Earlier waves are excluded because of the changes
in the Retirement Earnings Test that took place in 2000 and substantially changed the
policy environment for employment decisions of older workers. I draw initial conditions
for the joint distribution of state variables from a sample of individuals born between 1938
and 1943. The model starts in 2000 when these respondents were between 57 and 62 years
old. After accounting for missing data, these restrictions leave 422 persons with complete
information available in 2000 who are eligible for initial state draws. A larger sample of
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1,120 individuals with 5,450 available person-year observations is used to compute the
moments matched in the estimation.
The model distinguishes between thirty six individual types. Each type is defined
by the year of birth, position in the distribution of earnings, and the risk of being laid
off. The six birth year types are essential in establishing the age of laid off workers at
different stages of the business cycle. They form the basis of inference on the impact of
cyclical fluctuations in the asset values, job loss and job finding probabilities on the labor
supply of older workers as they approach retirement. Three earnings types are defined
by the AIME tertiles. Two layoff risk types, low and high, are identified based on the
HRS question that asks respondents to evaluate the likelihood of losing a job within a
year. I predict the likelihood of a layoff from a regression of self-reported probabilities on
the individual characteristics. An individual is assigned to a high risk type if predicted
probability exceeds 0.5, and to a low risk type otherwise. It has been shown in the
literature that job loss expectations have a high predictive power for actual job loss
(Stephens 2004). Accordingly, my risk indicator appears to be a valid predictor of the
actual layoff experiences. The monthly probability of a layoff in the estimation sample is
0.001 for low and 0.003 for the high risk type, a statistically significant difference. The
fractions of workers who have experienced job loss in the two groups are 0.132 and 0.293,
respectively.
The initial joint distribution of ages, assets, wage rates, AIME, health, medical ex-
penses, health insurance, labor supply and layoff risk for 10,000 simulated workers is
drawn from the 2000 HRS dataset using individual sampling weights. I assume that the
initial state summarizes all relevant information from earlier ages, and that it does not
reflect any anticipation of future changes to the policy environment, such as reforms of
the Social Security or the tax code. Drawing initial conditions from the data accounts for
some important empirical relationships between the variables of the model, as reflected
in Table 1. The table summarizes descriptive statistics for the initial distribution. For
example, the risk of layoff and the rates of unemployment are highest for the low income
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type, a correlation essential for the conclusions of the paper. Individuals with higher
lifetime income understandably hold more assets and earn higher wages. The initial state
also reflects a complicated connection between financial wellbeing and health. Workers of
the highest income type are healthier and pay higher out-of-pocket medical expenditures
while being more likely to hold jobs with employer provided health insurance. Hetero-
geneity in the layoff exposure accounts for an important fact that low skilled workers are
more likely to lose their jobs.
[TABLE 1]
5. Estimation methods
I estimate the model parameters in two stages similar to Gourinchas and Parker (2002);
De Nardi, et al. (2010); French and Jones (2011). First, I obtain the values of the
parameters determining exogenous probabilities of transition between the points of the
state space that can be identified without using the entire model, θp. This estimation
stage yields the transition processes for health, survival, medical expenses, wages, job
loss and job finding, and asset returns. At this stage, I also set up the policy rules for
taxes, Social Security and unemployment insurance.
Second, I use the method of simulated moments (McFadden 1989; Pakes and Pollard
1989; Gouriéroux and Monfort 1996) to estimate the structural parameters of the model,
while taking the first stage estimates as given. The vector of m = 14 parameters ob-
tained at the second stage, θs ∈ Θ, includes the coefficients of the utility and bequest
functions, the fixed costs of work, health and search costs, wage losses due to human cap-
ital depreciation and part-time employment, government transfers, leisure endowment,
the probability of getting unemployment benefits, and the variance of measurement error
in assets:
(12) θs = {θ1, θ2, b1, b2, L, φ0, φ1, ψ, %, d1, d2, C, λB, σ2εa}.
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The parameter space Θ ⊂ Rm is restricted to account for the lower and upper feasibility
boundaries of the parameter values, as dictated by the model.
I exploit five groups of moments for each age between 60 and 70. These are the rates of
employment conditional on health, the fraction of part time workers among the employed,
the means of monthly labor supply, the rates of job search among the non-participating,
and the quartiles of the asset distribution. In addition, I match the variance of assets
and the mean length of an unemployment spell, in total yielding 90 moment conditions.
Technical details of the estimation procedure are provided in appendices. Appendix
C describes the estimation of processes for health and wage transition probabilities. Ap-
pendix E provides a more detailed description of the MSM estimation. I limit discussion
in the rest of this section to the main aspects of the policy environment and aggregate
uncertainty.
5.1. Job finding and layoff probabilities
The job finding probabilities rely on the gross flows of workers between labor force states.
The gross flows are obtained from the rotating part of the basic CPS on males ages 50
and above.6 The probability that a worker unemployed in month t will become employed
within one month is used as job finding probability for actively searching individuals.
The probability of transition from non-participation to employment is used as job finding
probability for those who do not search.
Layoff probabilities are computed from the HRS retrospective job histories. I adjust
the monthly layoff probabilities by a factor of 1.3 for workers at high risk of layoff and
by a factor of 0.5 for workers at low risk. Adjustments are based on the differences of
job loss probabilities by layoff risk types in the data, so that the weighted average for the
6I use the CPS for job finding and the HRS for layoff probabilities. The CPS gives more accurate
information on monthly labor force status and has a larger sample size. Unfortunately it does not have
data on separation reasons for workers who have left the labor force, making it unusable for estimation of
involuntary separation rates among older workers who often leave the labor force in response to a layoff.
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two types is consistent with the overall probability of involuntary job loss.
I employ twelve month centered moving averages as job finding and layoff probabil-
ities in the model for the months with available data, 2000-2015. Beyond this period,
I converge the values to their sample averages over a period of three years. The mean
values of the estimated series are λ = 0.23 and δ = 0.004. Both probabilities for older
workers are lower than their counterparts for all ages. This is consistent with claims in
other studies documenting that mobility between labor force states declines with age (e.g.
Menzio, et al. 2015).
5.2. Asset returns and discounting
The annual discount rate for future payoffs β is set equal to 0.96. Workers invest their
wealth in housing, stock and an additional composite asset. The share of wealth invested
in each asset depends on worker’s income type. Workers of higher income type tend to
hold more wealth in stock, while housing is the main asset for those with low lifetime
income. Because of such variations in the portfolio structure, any shocks to the housing
or stock markets would impact individuals with various levels of wealth differently. I
obtain the net values of housing, direct stock holdings and IRA from the HRS RAND
data on the composition of assets. Stock holdings reflect both direct stock ownership
and the share of IRA invested in stocks, and I take the share of stocks in the IRA from
Gustman, et al. (2010). Using these data, I compute the share of each asset in a typical
portfolio held by workers of different income types.
The return on portfolio is the weighted average of returns on individual assets. The
rate of return on stocks is approximated by returns on large company stock from Ibbotson,
et al. (2017). Housing appreciation is based on the FHFA all-transactions index. All
returns are twelve-month moving averages of the original series adjusted for inflation.
Annualized rate of return on other assets is 4 percent, and the portfolio returns converge
to the 4 percent rate over three years after the end of the observed series.
Asset returns, the probability of job finding and the probability of layoff are the three
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sources of aggregate uncertainty in the model. Workers are fully rational and form their
expectations of the labor and financial markets based on the least squares forecasts from
a linear vector autoregression model of order three as supported by the data.
5.3. Government
Social Security
The model incorporates three major features of the Social Security policy. First, awarded
benefits are determined from the primary insurance amount (PIA), a transformation of
the AIME over two bend points defined by the SSA. Second, the benefits are subject to
the lower and upper limit. Finally, there is a penalty for Social Security take up before
the normal retirement age. The earliest Social Security eligibility age is sixty two, and
the normal retirement age of the simulated cohorts varies between sixty five and sixty six.
Since the model does not offer incentives for delayed retirement, I assume that everybody
applies for Social Security upon reaching the normal retirement age. I incorporate these
rules into the model with parameter values varying by year of birth. The exact policy
rules, institutional details and the values of the parameters used in the simulations are
described in Appendix D.
Taxes
Individuals pay federal, state and payroll taxes. I take the federal tax rates from the
annual tax rate schedules, head of household tables.7 The state tax rates are taken from
2001 Rhode Island tax rates schedule.8 Earnings are subject to Social Security and Medi-
7Source: http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/i1040–2005.pdf
8Ideally, I would like to use state tax rates for the respondent’s state of residence. Unfortunately,
I do not have access to the HRS state identifiers, so I have to impose a uniform state tax. I chose
Rhode Island because it was one of the last states to abandon piggyback taxes in 2001. It gives me a
straightforward way to estimate tax liability based on federal taxes. French and Jones (2011) claim it to
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care payroll tax at rate of 7.65 percent up to a year specific maximum. Earnings above
this maximum are taxed at rate 1.45 percent that only cover Medicare’s Hospital Insur-
ance.9. The Social Security benefits of early retirees may be taxed in accordance with
the Social Security Earnings Test (SSET) as described in Appendix D.
Unemployment insurance
The amount of unemployment benefits is set to replace 50 percent of pre-displacement
earnings, with a maximum of 1,300 dollars per month. The maximum value roughly
corresponds to the state average published by the U.S. Department of Labor in 2001
“Comparison of State Unemployment Laws”. According to the same source, between
January 2000 and December 2014 the average duration of unemployment benefits was
3.8 months. The estimated probability of unemployment benefits reward targets this
average.
6. Baseline estimates of the structural parameters
In this section, I discuss the estimates and explain how each structural parameter is
identified from the data. Furthermore, I show how the model fits the data and high-
light the role of search frictions, a new modeling component that is central to the main
contribution of the paper.
6.1. Estimates and identification
Table 2 contains the MSM estimates of the model parameters and the standard errors.
I discuss below each estimate relative to the benchmarks available in the literature, and
explain the identification strategy.
be a fairly representative state in terms of income tax rates.
9Source: http://www.ssa.gov/oact/progdata/taxRates.html
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Individual preferences are characterized by the parameters of the CRRA utility and
bequest functions. The consumption weight, θ̂1 = 0.54, reflects the relative tastes for
leisure and consumption, with higher values implying stronger preference for work. It is
identified primarily from the hours of labor supply. The estimate is within the interval
obtained by French and Jones (2011) for different values of willingness to work index,
θ1 ∈ [0.412, 0.967]. The coefficient of relative risk aversion for a consumption-leisure
bundle, θ̂2 = 4.9, and is consistent with the life-cycle retirement literature, e.g. French
and Jones (2011) and French (2005). Under the assumption of fixed labor supply, this
estimate translates into the coefficient of relative risk aversion for consumption R(C) =
1 − θ̂1(1 − θ̂2) = 3.1, a conventional measure that is easy to compare to the broad
labor supply literature. The coefficient of relative risk aversion is identified by the asset
quartiles that reflect the extent of precautionary savings accumulated to insure against
adverse income and health shocks.
[TABLE 2]
The parameters of the bequest function are identified from the upper quartiles of the
asset distribution. In the data wealthier individuals keep on saving instead of divesting
even after they have accumulated sufficient assets to insure against the risks incorporated
into the model environment. The presence of an altruistic bequest motive generates this
behavior in the model. In the terminal period t = tT the bequest motive becomes








which after adjusting for the scaling of the coefficients gives a value of twenty three
thousand dollars. This is the minimum amount of saving an agent needs in order to leave
non-zero bequest to an heir instead of consuming the entire amount himself. This amount
is low enough to suggest that at the terminal age the bequest motive is operational for the
majority of workers. The marginal propensity to consume out of the final period wealth
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is one for individuals whose assets are below this threshold, and MPC = dC/dA = 0.02
for those who hold more. Analogous relationships can be derived for other ages, hence
the maintained level of saving in the top of the wealth distribution and the rate of saving
among those whose assets are above the operational bequest threshold jointly identify
the intensity of the bequest motive b̂1 = 1.008 and the bequest shifter b̂2 = 1.081.
The monthly time endowment, L, is 364 hours, identified jointly by the employment
and labor supply moments. The fixed cost of work for a sixty-year-old worker is 60
hours per month. The estimated slope of the linear fixed cost function suggests that
over a year the monthly fixed cost of work increases by approximately one hour. Notice
that while my model yields approximately the same monthly fixed cost as French and
Jones (2011) for a sixty-year-old worker, the age trend is substantially smaller.10 The
explanation comes from the introduction of labor market frictions in my model, and I
discuss it further in Section 6.3. The fixed cost parameters are identified by declining
trends in the participation rates and labor supply. The additional cost of work caused
by ill health is 0.2 hours per month. This parameter is identified by the rates of labor
force participation conditional on health status. The estimated cost of search parameter
is 108 hours per month, implying that looking for work takes about the same time as
half-time employment. Identification of the cost of search is based on the search intensity
moments.
Together these estimated parameters of the utility function and the time constraint
capture the way in which workers intertemporally substitute their labor supply. For
example, Frisch intertemporal elasticity of substitution for a healthy sixty year old worker
employed N60 = 160 hours a month would be approximated by
η =
L̂−N60 − φ̂(60)− ψ̂
N60
· 1− θ̂1(1− θ̂2)
θ̂2
= 0.567,
10The annual fixed cost of work at age sixty in French and Jones (2011) is φP0 = 826, and the age
trend is φP1 = 54.7 hours.
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assuming that the borrowing constraint is not binding. This value falls just above the
middle of the interval between 0.37 and 0.70 which according to Chetty, et al. (2011)
defines the range of the micro estimates for Frisch intensive margin elasticity.
Turning to the parameters of the budget constraint, the most important is the wage
loss associated with displacement. It is estimated as 15 percent of the wage received by
otherwise similar non-displaced worker. The cost of search and wage loss are identified by
the share of non-working individuals who look for work at each age, and by the variation
of job finding probabilities across time. The estimate is close to several reference points
available in the displacement literature. For example, Couch and Placzek (2010) estimate
the mid-term wage losses of displaced workers six years after separation in the range from
13 to 15 percent. Similarly, Davis and von Wachter (2011) find that displaced workers in
the U.S. lose 10 to 20 percent of their earnings in the long term depending on whether
separation occurred during an expansion or a contraction.
If displaced workers who obtain good wage draws are more likely to stay in the labor
market after job loss, wages observed in the data will be biased upwards. The model
predicts that one year after job loss wages of reemployed workers will be 14 percent
lower than their counterfactual wages if job loss did not occur. However, the wage loss
estimated from the simulated data by the fixed effects displacement regression in Section
2 is only 9 percent. This implies that the standard displacement regressions prevalent in
the existing literature may underestimate wage losses of reemployed workers by as much
as one third, and even more when we consider all workers affected by displacement.
The premium for full time employment, d2, is 29 percent of the wage rate. This pa-
rameter is identified by the rate of part time employment, and the value is consistent
with 25 percent part time employment penalty found by Aaronson and French (2004).
The monthly government transfer C = $345 is identified by lower asset quantiles be-
cause guaranteed consumption minimum discourages saving among the poor. In annual
equivalent, it is on the same scale as the consumption floor in Hubbard, et al. (1995).
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6.2. Model fit
Figure 2 shows the model fit for matched moments. I further provide some results to
check whether the model captures some of the data facts that were not directly used
in the estimation. The model predicts well the number of workers affected by layoffs
over the lifetime and the difference in the timing of labor force exit for displaced and
non-displaced workers. Conforming with the data, the share of workers who retire after
a layoff grows steadily until peaking at age 65. The model also reproduces the matrix of
transitions between labor force states, with an exception of exit rates from unemployment
that are somewhat lower than in the data.
[FIGURE 2]
6.3. The role of search frictions
The life-cycle models of retirement from the labor force typically ignore search frictions,
allowing for no job destruction and costless access to positive draws from the wage dis-
tribution. Usually under these assumptions the transition from work to retirement is
driven by changes in wage and non-wage income, health, government policies, or fixed
cost of work. I show that search frictions represent an additional incentive to exit the
labor force, accounting for up to 20 percent of retirements. Hence, the omission of these
labor market frictions results in a nontrivial bias. To show how search affects the model
predictions and estimates, I revert to a standard life-cycle retirement model by assuming
that jobs are always available (λt,τ = 1), never destroyed (δt,τ = 0), search is free (% = 0),
and there is no unemployment insurance (λB = 0). I compare the original model and the
frictionless one in two experiments.
In the first experiment, I assume that the labor markets are frictionless and use the
estimated model parameters to create a simulated dataset. The employment rate of
workers who have reached their normal retirement age in this simulation is on average
five percentage points higher than in the data. The fraction of workers retired by the
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age seventy is underestimated by eight percentage points, which is 14 percent of the
retirement prevalence at this age. These differences are substantial, and indicate that
without search a model of retirement would have to overload other channels in order to
match the data.
In the second experiment, I estimate a frictionless model and identify the parameters
that turn out to be the most sensitive to the omission of search. I find that the main
change occurs in the fixed cost function, increasing the fixed cost of work for a sixty five
year old worker by 70 percent. This result appeals to earlier discussions of the role of
fixed costs. Rogerson and Wallenius (2013) estimate that the time fixed cost required to
generate sharp retirement from the labor force for acceptable values of the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution of labor supply exceeds the time required to hold a half-time
job. This is implausibly high, and my experiment indicates that one of the reasons is
that the fixed costs absorb the role of other retirement incentives that were omitted from
the model. By introducing labor market frictions, I explain a portion of this excessive
fixed cost, which is an important methodological contribution.
7. Discussion and counterfactuals
I now use the model to analyze the impact of involuntary job loss on the labor market
outcomes of older workers. Taking full advantage of the structural approach, I construct
counterfactual life paths of twin workers who are identical in all initial characteristics and
received shocks, except that one of the twins is displaced at some point in his life while
the other is not. Comparison of the outcomes of these twin workers over the life cycle
yields a flexible tool helpful to evaluate a wide range of job loss consequences.
First, I estimate the impact of involuntary job loss on the labor force attachment
of older workers and validate the model by comparing its results to the corresponding
estimates of displacement regressions. Next, I compute the cost of displacement in terms
of a cash transfer required to compensate a displaced worker for the total lifetime utility
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loss caused by a layoff, a broader measure than the earnings cost of job loss that is often
used in the displacement literature. I further decompose the total cost of job loss into two
components that are associated with the labor market frictions and post-displacement
wage penalty.
Because the incidence and the cost of displacement are both related to the probabilities
of losing and finding a job, I consider in a separate section how the cost of job loss and
post-displacement labor force attachment vary over the business cycle. Finally, I show
how the labor market conditions interact with the asset shocks affecting the retirement
of displaced workers. To illustrate this point, I estimate the effect of the Great Recession
on the retirement decisions of workers who have reached their late fifties by the beginning
of the economic downturn.
7.1. Labor force attachment after involuntary job loss
To begin with, I show how displacement affects the labor force attachment and the timing
of retirement. I take a sample of older workers and simulate their behavior under several
different scenarios. In the first, baseline, scenario workers never lose their jobs even
though they anticipate such possibility when making their decisions. In each of the other,
displacement, scenarios workers are laid off at a specific age that ranges between 58 and
70. Apart from job loss, in all scenarios, workers receive the same shocks. Therefore, their
simulated histories completely coincide with the baseline scenario up to the age of layoff,
and any differences after that age are solely ascribed to the job loss. The comparison of
the levels of labor supply chosen by workers under the baseline and displacement scenarios
shows how labor force attachment is affected by job loss.
Involuntary job loss on average decreases the lifetime labor supply of displaced workers
by 2,100 hours, an equivalent of one year’s full time work. Coming to fourteen months
over the lifetime, the reduction of labor supply following displacement is even larger on the
extensive margin. This indicates that displaced workers decrease their labor supply on the
extensive as well as intensive margins. Indeed, two years after job loss, displaced workers
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are two and a half times more likely to work part time, and 28 percent less likely to hold
a job than if they maintained steady employment. These results are consistent with the
reduced form estimates discussed in Section 2. The employment loss due to job loss in the
displacement regressions is thirteen months, and the reduction of the employment rate
two years after displacement is 35 percent. Because the MSM estimator did not target
any moments that characterize the labor supply response to job loss, comparability of
these results is essential for model validation.
Finding that job loss is associated with early retirement is consistent with earlier
studies (e.g., Chan and Stevens, 2001). However, looking beyond the averages reveals the
existence of a sizable group of individuals who respond to job loss by working more in
the years following displacement. One in six laid off workers would increase their lifetime
labor supply by an average of 2,460 hours, or fourteen months in full time equivalent.
The labor supply response to job loss varies because the choice of retirement time may
mitigate the displacement cost in two different ways. On the one hand, early retirement
eliminates the need of costly job search. A worker whose expected benefits from finding
a job are lower than the expected cost of search would benefit from retiring early. On
the other hand, delayed retirement can help recover retirement savings used up during an
unemployment spell. The cases of delayed retirement are mainly linked to the interaction
between retirement assets and expected future earnings. Displaced workers on average
reach the age at which they would have otherwise retired with lower assets than if they
had not been displaced, as they would have withdrawn some funds to finance consumption
while unemployed. Some of the workers with better wage offers at hand will find it optimal
to stay employed and replenish savings. In the simulated data, workers who delay their
retirement earn substantially higher pre-displacement wages. Layoffs therefore have a
differentiated impact: they are more likely to drive low income workers out of the labor
market, while making higher wage earners stay longer.
Because responses to layoffs vary, displacement outcomes in the economy depend on
the composition of the affected workers. For example, if job loss only affected low wage
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earners in the bottom 10 percent of the wage distribution, then most of the displaced
workers would retire at the same time or earlier and only 11.6 percent would delay
retirement from the labor force. However, if affected workers were concentrated in the
median 20 percent of the wage distribution, the rate of delayed retirement would rise
to 14.5 percent. It would further increase to 27.7 percent if the top 20 percent of wage
earners lost their jobs. These experiments speak to the compositions of workers affected
by layoffs, since it has been changing over time and is likely to change again in the future.
For example, the Great Recession has pushed an unprecedented number of white collar
workers into unemployment. This analysis is informative of the way in which the impact
of job loss on the transitions from work to retirement depends on the composition of
the older workforce, and the possible concentration of layoffs in specific industries or
occupations.
7.2. The cost of job loss
There is ample evidence that displaced workers suffer from a broad range of negative
consequences of the job loss, including earnings and employment instability, deteriorating
health, increase in mortality, and adverse effects on family, such as higher divorce rates
and lower educational achievement of the children (Davis and von Wachter 2011). Here
I measure the cost of job loss for older workers as a monetary transfer required to make
a displaced worker indifferent between his current state and otherwise equivalent state in
which he was not laid off from a job.
Although a large part of the cost of job loss can be traced to forgone earnings, the full
cost is substantially more complicated than the change in the lifetime earnings alone. On
the one hand, the full cost amplifies earnings losses by adding non-monetary costs of job
loss, including time costs incurred while looking for a new job, the increasing difficulty
of working late in life due to the age trends in health and fixed costs of work, disruption
of health insurance, and costs associated with non-linearity of the preferences. On the
other hand, it accounts for the ability of workers to partially offset the cost of job loss by
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adjusting their labor supply, consumption and Social Security take up decisions. Overall,
this measure is broader and more comprehensive than the earnings cost of job loss which
is conventionally used in the displacement literature.
Panel A of Figure 3 shows the estimated cost of job loss for each age of layoff between
fifty eight and seventy when the probabilities of job loss and job finding are fixed at their
long-term averages. On average, the lifetime cost of job loss for workers displaced at
these ages amounts to twenty nine thousand dollars, which is about one year of earnings
for this age group. The cost of job loss declines with the age of displacement, and the
Social Security rules appear essential to understanding this dynamics. Workers displaced
in their late fifties bear the highest cost, losing around forty thousand dollars over the
remaining lifetime – forty percent more than the average. The cost of job loss falls
with the approach of early retirement age, so that workers displaced at sixty two lose
17 percent less than if they lost their jobs four years earlier. The cost of job loss does
not change much until the full retirement age when it sharply falls by an additional 23
percent relative to the cost of job loss for fifty eight year olds. It remains consistently
high, around twenty thousand dollars, even for workers in their late sixties.
[FIGURE 3]
To understand the link between the cost of job loss and the Social Security retirement
age, recall the previously documented spikes in the rates of labor force exit at early and
full retirement ages (e.g. Rust and Phelan 1997). At any age, involuntary job loss is not
going to affect the lifetime outcomes of a worker who intended to retire exactly at this
age in any event. A mass of workers who plan to leave the labor force around early and
full retirement ages will therefore lower the average cost of displacement at these ages.
The expected remaining working time of those who reached retirement age is shorter,
both because these workers are now older and because they have an option to take up
Social Security. The shortening of expected employment time prevents the cost of job
loss to increase again after passing the peaks of retirement. Of course, lower averages
do not mean that specific individuals are better off being displaced around the normal
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retirement age, as in each case the cost of job loss would depend on the anticipated
individual retirement date which may be well past the Social Security age.
To see what generates the cost of job loss, note that displaced workers are adversely
affected via two channels. First, they suffer a permanent reduction in future wages.
Second, they lose earnings and access to health insurance due to search frictions. The
two channels represent respectively intensive and extensive margins of the cost associated
with job loss and can be explored separately. The intensive margin can be shut down by
eliminating displacement wage penalty (d1 = 0), while the extensive margin is removed
under the assumption of frictionless labor markets (λt,τ = 1 and % = 0).
Decomposing the total cost by channel, I find that in stable economic conditions most
of the losses are due to the reduction of post-displacement wages (intensive margin),
which accounts for 70 percent of the total. The remaining 30 percent is due to the loss of
earnings over the periods of unemployment that follow a job loss (extensive margin). The
share of the extensive margin depends on the age of displacement, as shown in Figure
3. Search frictions are relatively more important for workers laid off around the normal
retirement age due to the increasing number of displaced workers who give up potential
earnings by retiring early without attempting to search. The fraction of costs due to
search peaks at displacement age sixty four where it accounts for more than a third of
the total.
7.3. Job loss over the business cycle
The probabilities of job loss and job finding vary over the business cycle, and their
dynamics affect both the incidence and the cost of job loss. In this section, I repeat a set
of experiments similar to those from sections 7.1. and 7.2. to estimate the impact of job
loss in a recession on the labor force attachment and the cost of displacement.
Workers displaced during a recession face lower probability of job finding and higher
chances of repeated displacement. I set the recessionary probabilities of job finding and
job loss equal to the estimates obtained at the trough of the Great Recession (λrec = 0.14
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and δrec = 0.005). The benchmark probabilities remain fixed at their long-term average
levels as in the previous section. A recession lasts for one year, after which job finding
and job loss probabilities revert to their long-term averages.
Business cycle fluctuations exacerbate the negative impact of displacement on the
labor force attachment. The lifetime labor supply of older workers displaced in a recession
decreases by additional 450 hours, or two and a half months of full time work. Accounting
for the extended duration of search, their total time in the labor force is three months
lower than that of the identical workers displaced in more favorable economic conditions.
Recessions further polarize the response by workers who adjust their hours of work in the
opposite directions. Those who work less over the lifetime now supply 14 percent hours
less, and those who work more increase the number of hours by additional 12 percent. In
monetary terms, these changes in the labor force attachment translate into an additional
loss of five thousand dollars over the lifetime, generated almost exclusively by search
frictions which in a recession account for 45 percent of the total loss (panel B of Figure
3).
Not only do displaced workers lose more if laid off during a recession, there are more
displacements that occur in a weak economy. What is the overall impact of an economic
downturn, like the Great Recession of 2007-2009, on the labor force attachment of workers
who would have planned to retire around this time? To answer this question, I consider
an artificial cohort of workers whose age is between 57 and 62 at the end of 2004, just
over three years past the trough of the previous recession in November 2001. When the
new recession ensues three years later in December 2007, these workers (aged 60-65 by
that time) will be hit directly in the process of transition to retirement.
To estimate the impact of the recession on the retirement behavior of this cohort, I
simulate two datasets. In the first simulation, the probabilities of layoff and job finding are
fixed at their long term averages. The second simulation uses the actual job finding and
layoff probabilities registered between the beginning of the simulation period in December
2004 and December 2010, a year and a half past the trough of the Great Recession. This
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experiment introduces labor market cyclicality into the environment of older workers as
they transition to retirement. Comparing labor force transitions in the two datasets, I
can now discern how the rates of exit from the labor force vary at different stages of the
business cycle.
The solid line in Figure 4 represents the percentage difference in the monthly new
retirements observed in the simulations with the cyclical probabilities against the bench-
mark case that uses the long-term averages. The positive and negative values represent
respectively higher and lower rates of retirement relative to the stable economy scenario.
As the probabilities of job loss and job finding deviate from their average values, the
new retirements respond by substantial variation with the range of changes of about 13
percent. The number of new retirements steadily increases throughout the recession, with
the peak difference of 7 percent reached in the middle of 2009. With the economy im-
proving, the number of new retirements declines to the low difference point of -6 percent
towards the end of 2010. Overall, the entire cohort retires one and a half months earlier
in the recession.
[FIGURE 4]
7.4. Involuntary job loss and the asset shocks
The results discussed in the previous section show that the cyclical variations in job
finding and layoff probabilities are important for retirement behavior, and that more
retirements occur when the labor market is weak. Another aspect of the business cycle
that is highly relevant for the decision to retire is the performance of financial markets.
The retirement wealth of the simulated cohort was depleted as the stock markets shrank
by more than 50 percent over a year and a half of the Great Recession, accompanied by
a comparable decline in the value of the housing equity. The stock markets also fell by
more than 30 percent during the dot-com bubble of the 2000-2002. The estimates of the
recession impact would therefore be incomplete without accounting for another major
feature of the Great Recession, the negative shock to the returns on assets.
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It is commonly acknowledged that while layoffs accelerate, asset losses postpone re-
tirement. For example, Coile and Levine (2010) document how the media view of the
impact that the Great Recession had on retirement evolved over time. Initially envision-
ing delayed retirement due to the crash of financial markets, it later increasingly turned
to the predictions of early retirement caused by unfavorable labor market conditions. As
in both recent recessions asset shocks that have affected retirement wealth coincided with
the cyclical variations of job finding and layoff probabilities, the total effect of recessions
on the retirement behavior of older workers is ambiguous. Using the model, I can isolate
the impact of shocks that have affected asset and labor markets on retirement and the
cost of job loss.
To model the financial impact of the recession on retirement, I introduce a solitary
unanticipated negative shock to the value of assets and compute the resulting change in
the timing of retirement. I find that decline in asset returns that takes place while the
probabilities of job loss and job finding remain fixed at their long-term average values
indeed forces workers to stay in the labor force longer. A 20 percent shock to asset values
on average delays retirement by 4 months, while a 50 percent shock produces a delay of
almost one year.
Adding the asset shocks to the recession counterfactuals from section 7.3, I can simu-
late the joint impact of layoffs and asset returns during the Great Recession. The dotted
line in Figure 4 shows percentage change in new retirements during the recession once the
variation in asset returns has been taken into account. The early retirement peak shifts
to the left, so that workers who were not yet fully affected by the negative asset shocks
self-select to retire at the very beginning of the recession. Later on however more workers
delay retirement from the labor force in an attempt to make up for wealth losses. With
both asset and labor market dynamics taken into consideration, I find that workers retir-
ing during the Great Recession would on average postpone retirement by approximately
five months. Intuitively, asset losses dominate the final outcome for two reasons. First,
the two forces do not entirely cancel each other out as job loss itself leads to delayed
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retirement for some of the displaced workers. Second, fewer people are affected by layoffs
than by changes in asset returns, even when the impact of a layoff is bigger in magnitude.
8. Conclusion
At least one in five older workers in the United States is affected by involuntary job
loss shortly before retirement from the labor force. As the probabilities of job finding
decrease with age, displaced older workers experience longer unemployment spells and
substantial reduction in earnings over the remaining lifetime. Faced with the difficulty of
reemployment, many stop searching and permanently exit the labor force. Involuntary
job loss and labor market frictions therefore potentially represent an important retirement
incentive. To estimate the cost of job loss for older workers and understand its effect on
the transition from work to retirement, I construct a dynamic programming model of
retirement with search frictions.
I estimate the structural parameters of the model using the method of simulated mo-
ments and the data from the Health and Retirement Study. The model confirms that
search frictions and involuntary job loss are essential to understanding of retirement, as
they account for 10 percent of the retirement trend. In a frictionless environment, the
model predicts that the fraction of retirements otherwise explained by search is predom-
inantly absorbed by the fixed cost of work. This result explains why the fixed costs of
work are excessively high in the standard lifecycle models of labor supply and retirement.
The average cost of involuntary job loss measured by a compensation required to
keep a worker indifferent between the states of employment and unemployment due to
displacement is equivalent to one year of full-time earnings. Seventy percent of this cost
is attributed to the post-displacement wage reduction, the rest is due to search frictions.
The cost of losing a job in a contraction with job loss and job finding probabilities equal to
those observed at the trough of the Great Recession is approximately 15 percent higher.
This difference is mainly generated by search frictions that account for a substantially
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larger portion of the total cost during economic downturns.
Displaced workers on average retire about one year earlier than they would have done
without a job loss, however 18 percent of the simulated workers postpone their retirement
in response to a layoff. The fraction of displaced workers who retire early increases during
recessions when the labor market is weak. Yet, in the two most recent recessions, the
negative impact of job loss on the lifetime labor supply was partially offset by retirement
delay caused by decline in savings as they were hit by the plunge of the stock markets and
the housing bubble. I estimate that the simultaneous shocks to the values of assets, layoff
and job finding probabilities would lead the cohort of workers who approached retirement
age at the onset of the recession to postpone retirement by approximately five months.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the initial state distribution
Variable Income Income Income
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3
Fraction in good health .81 .87 .95
Fraction working .84 .81 .87
Fraction unemployed .03 .02 .01
Fraction at high risk of layoff .49 .53 .39
Fraction with employer provided
health insurance .58 .73 .83
Labor supply (conditional on employment), in hours per month
Mean 180 180 188
Median 160 160 180
Standard deviation 55.1 69.8 70.0
Wage rate (conditional on employment), in 2000 dollars
Mean 21.4 34.0 38.2
Median 11.5 15.9 15.0
Standard deviation 18.3 35.4 36.6
AIME, in 2000 dollars
Mean 1,789 3,464 4,878
Median 1,877 3,452 4,793
Standard deviation 684 379 541
Assets, in thousands of 2000 dollars
Mean 309 428 704
Median 143 215 394
Standard deviation 493 520 838
Monthly medical expenses, in 2000 dollars
Mean 55.3 82.5 63.9
Median 27.2 27.1 32.0
Standard deviation 87.1 204.9 128.2
Mean age, years 59.3 59.9 59.6
Sample observations 140 132 150
Notes: HRS white non-Hispanic male workers born in 1938-1943 with at least ten years of non-government
employment. Excludes early recipients of Social Security (before 62) and recipients of SSI/SSDI. Income
types 1-3 correspond to the tertiles of the AIME distribution.
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Table 2: Estimates of structural parameters
Parameter Estimate Standard
error
θ1: Consumption weight 0.536 0.035
θ2: Coefficient of relative risk aversion 4.93 0.180
b1: Intensity of bequest motive 1.008 0.098
b2: Bequest shifter 1.084 0.204
L: Monthly leisure endowment, hours 364 22.1
φ0: Fixed cost of work at 60, hours 59.8 2.69
φ1: Fixed cost of work, slope 0.089 0.026
ψ: Cost of bad health, hours 0.186 0.027
%: Cost of search, hours 108 25.3
d1: Wage loss due to displacement 0.150 0.013
d2: Wage loss due to part time employment 0.294 0.027
C: Government transfers, USD 345 9.78
λB: Probability of getting unemployment benefits 0.850 0.128
σ2εa : Variance of the measurement error in assets 0.205 0.010
χ2 statistic = 485, degrees of freedom = 76
Notes: Method of Simulated Moments estimates of the structural parameters, conditional on exogenous
estimates of the state transition probabilities. Initial values of state variables are drawn from the 2000
HRS sample of white non-Hispanic males 50 and older with at least ten years of non-government employ-
ment, born in years 1938-1943. Excludes early recipients of Social Security (before 62) and recipients of
SSI/SSDI. Estimation uses diagonal weighting matrix.
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